
AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE

For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.1 (1) of CAR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.

Airbus Industrie A330 Series Aeroplanes

AD/A330/11

Pitot Probes

3/2003

Applicability: Model A330 series aeroplanes, all serial numbers (S/N) fitted with Thales Avionics pitot probes part number (P/N) C16195AA with a S/N lower than 4760.

Note 1: Thales Avionics was previously known as "Sextant" or "Sextant Avionique".

Note 2: P/N C16195AA pitot probes have been installed either during production in accordance with Airbus Industrie modification 45638 or whilst in service in accordance with Service Bulletin (SB) A330-34-3071.

Requirement: Unless already accomplished, clean the drain holes of the three pitot probes in accordance with the Thales Avionics SB C16195A-34-002 dated 17 October 2002.

Note 3: DGAC AD 2002-594(B) refers.

Compliance: Within 700 hours time in service after the effective date of this Directive.

This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 20 March 2003.

Background: The Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile of France has advised that an operator reported airspeed discrepancy events on an A320 aircraft, investigations revealed that the discrepancies were caused by a manufacturing defect at the drain holes.

The manufacturing defect contributed to the accumulation of external pollution which, combined with severe weather conditions, obstructed the air intake of the pitot probes, leading to bad total pressure Pt detection and therefore erroneous CAS/MACH parameters delivered by the ADR.



James Coyne
Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority

30 January 2003