
AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE

For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.001(1) of CASR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.

Airbus Industrie A330 Series Aeroplanes**AD/A330/75****Exhaust - Thrust Reverser Hinge****9/2007**

Applicability: AIRBUS A330 aircraft, -243, -341, -342 and -343 models, except those on which AIRBUS modification 56129 has been embodied in production or AIRBUS Service Bulletin (SB) A330-78-3017 has been embodied in service.

Note 1: This applicability is established considering that the aircraft have not been subject to any replacement of the thrust reverser unit since delivery or SB A330-78-3017 embodiment. It is the responsibility of the operator to check that its aircraft is in compliance with the present Airworthiness Directive (AD).

Requirement: Replace all sleeves of the thrust reverser unit hinge n°5 (LH and RH) and

Identify and replace all affected pins of the thrust reverser unit hinge n°5 (LH and RH) in accordance with AIRBUS SB A330-78-3017, for each thrust reverser unit.

Note 2: AIRBUS SB A330-78-3017 covers Rolls-Royce SB RB.211-78-AF273.

Note 3: EASA AD 2007-0166 dated 15 June 2007 refers.

Compliance: Before 31 July 2008.

This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 30 August 2007.

Background: It has been discovered that a batch of sleeves and pins of the Rolls-Royce Trent 700 Thrust Reverser Unit (TRU) hinge n°5 has not been subjected to the correct precipitation hardening. This production quality issue, if not corrected, can lead to the complete failure of the hinge n°5 - the remaining hinges may not sustain ultimate load - resulting in the worst case, to the TRU release from the pylon, which constitutes an unsafe condition.

The degradation of the mechanical specifications of these parts puts into question the current design life goal of these parts. Consequently, the sleeve and affected pin on the TRU hinge n°5 must be removed from service.



David Punshon
Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority

25 June 2007