

---

**AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE**

---

For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.001(1) of CASR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.

---

**Airbus Industrie A330 Series Aeroplanes****AD/A330/105      Outboard Flap - Sensor Strut at Flap Track 4      9/2009**

**Applicability:** Model A330-202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and -343 aircraft, all serial numbers, except aircraft with AIRBUS modification 48579 incorporated in production or AIRBUS Service Bulletin (SB) A330-27-3092 incorporated in service.

**Requirement:** Action in accordance with the requirements of DGAC AD F-2003-425.

*Note: AIRBUS Service Bulletins A330-27-3091 initial issue and A330-27-3092 initial issue, or later DGAC/EASA approved revisions, refer.*

**Compliance:**

1. For the Requirement document paragraph 3.1. inspection:  
  
Repeat at intervals not to exceed 18 months, until paragraph 3.2. modification is incorporated.
2. For the Requirement document paragraph 3.2. modification:  
  
Unless already accomplished, before 30 September 2009.

This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 27 August 2009.

**Background:** Reports were received of sensor strut corrosion and the attachment bolt sheared. Investigation revealed that the corrosion was due to the wear of the protective surface, and the attachment bolt sheared due to fatigue rupture subsequent to an increase of the axial loads. This situation could lead to total loss of the sensor strut function resulting in the inability to detect disconnection at tracks 4 and 5 which, in the worst case, could lead to separation of the outboard flap.



David Villiers  
Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority

15 July 2009