

Boeing 767 Series Aeroplanes

AD/B767/61
Amdt 2

Thrust Reverser Control System

6/96

Applicability: All Boeing 767 series aircraft equipped with General Electric CF6-80C2 series engines not incorporating Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78-0063.

Requirement: 1. Inspect and test the thrust reverser system in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78-0047 Rev 2 or Rev 3.

If any of the inspections or tests specified in the Requirement of this Directive cannot be successfully performed or fail the acceptance criteria, either rectify the defect or de-activate the defective thrust reverser per the appropriate B767 maintenance procedures before further flight. Only one thrust reverser per aircraft may be de-activated at any one time.

Any thrust reverser that has been de-activated as a result of the requirements of this Directive is to be rectified; the inspections/tests specified in the applicable service bulletin successfully performed; and the thrust reverser re-activated within 10 days.

2. Install an additional locking device on the thrust reversers in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78-0063 Rev 2 or Rev 3.

Incorporation of Boeing SB 767-78-0063 Rev 2 or Rev 3 provides terminating action for the inspections and tests mandated by Requirement 1 of this Directive.

Note. FAA AD 95-13-12 R1 refers and supersedes FAA AD 91-22-02.

Compliance: 1. Unless previously accomplished, prior to 15 August 1996 and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 3,000 flight hours since last inspection. Upon completion of the initial inspection special provisions apply to Para 111H of SB B767-78-0047 Rev 3 (see below).

Compliance with Para 111H of SB 767-78-0047 Rev 3: At intervals not to exceed 1,500 flight hours, or whenever maintenance action is taken that would disturb the DPV grounding circuit.

Note. Para 111H refers to testing the integrity of the safety grounding wire for the thrust reverser directional pilot valve (DPV) "Hot Short" protection.

2. No later than 31 December 1998.

Background: The FAA have advised of a Boeing 767 accident in which a thrust reverser apparently deployed in flight. This can result in reduced controllability of the aircraft.

This AD has been issued in order to detect and prevent possible discrepancies in the thrust reverser system that can result in inadvertent deployment of the thrust reverser during flight.

SCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

This amendment mandates an additional locking device for the thrust reverser which also provides terminating action for the inspections/tests mandated by previous issues of this Directive.

The original issue of this AD became effective on 30 December 1991.

Amendment 1 of this AD became effective on 11 November 1993.