
AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE

On the effective date specified below, and for the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below revokes Airworthiness Directive (AD) AD/PARA/14 and issues the following AD under subregulation 39.001(1) of CASR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.

Parachute Equipment**AD/PARA/14
Amdt 1****OMEGA / QUICK Personal Parachute****10/2005
DM**

Applicability: Performance Variable e.K. OMEGA XXS, XS, S, M, L, and XL (Container-System) with QUICK 120, 135, 150, 180, or 220 (Reserve Parachute) Personal Parachutes.

Requirement:

1. Apply the bartecs on the binding tape of the flap No. 3 of the Omega Container-System in accordance with Performance Variable Service Bulletin SB-O-200501, dated 18 July 2005.
2. At each packing of the main parachute, perform the visual inspection of the bartecs in accordance with Performance Variable Service Bulletin SB-O-200501.

Note: LBA AD D-2005-248R1 refers.

Compliance:

1. Before the next jump after 29 July 2005.
2. As of the effective date of this Directive.

This Amendment becomes effective on 29 July 2005.

Background: The LBA received two reports of incidents and one report of a fatal accident, where the main parachute in combination with the Container-System did not fully deploy. The cause of the incidents and fatal accident is still under investigation. As an interim action until the investigation is finalised, further use of the affected parachutes was prohibited.

Amendment 1 is issued in response to a revision of the related LBA AD, which removes the prohibition on use of the affected parachutes by introduction of a new service bulletin from the manufacturer. This requires modification and other actions to prevent malfunction of the main parachute in combination with the container-system, caused by line entanglement with flap No. 2 of the main container.



David Villiers
Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority

27 July 2005