

British Aerospace BAe 125 Series Aeroplanes

AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE

For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.1 (1) of CAR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section; (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.

AD/HS 125/163

Wire Bundle Chafing

1/2001

Applicability: Model Hawker 800XP series aeroplanes, as listed in Raytheon Service Bulletin SB 24-3212, dated August 1999; and Hawker 800 (U-125A) series aeroplanes, as listed in Raytheon Service Bulletin SB 24-3213, Revision 1, dated February 2000.

Requirement:

1. Conduct a one-time detailed visual inspection of the panel "JA" wire bundle in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of SB 24-3212 (for Model 800XP series aeroplanes); or SB 24-3213, Revision 1 (for Model 800 (U-125A) series aeroplanes); as applicable. Ensure that:
 - a. the wire bundle is routed correctly, in accordance with Figure 1 of the applicable service bulletin, and
 - b. a minimum clearance of 6mm (0.25-inch) exists between the wire bundle from relay "KT" and the fuel cross-feed valve operating lever throughout its range of travel.

If the wire bundle is routed correctly and sufficient clearance exists, no further action is required by this Directive.

Note 1: For the purposes of this Directive, a detailed visual inspection is defined as: "An intensive visual examination of a specific structural area, system, installation, or assembly to detect damage, failure, or irregularity. Available lighting is normally supplemented with a direct source of good lighting at intensity deemed appropriate by the inspector. Inspection aids such as mirror, magnifying lenses, etc., may be used. Surface cleaning and elaborate access procedures may be required."

2. If the wire bundle is not routed correctly or if sufficient clearance does not exist, perform a detailed visual inspection of the wire bundle to relay "KT" for chafing, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of SB 24-3212 or SB 24-3213, Revision 1; as applicable.
 - a. If chafing is not detected, ensure that the wire bundle is routed correctly and ensure that a minimum clearance of 6mm (0.25-inch) exists between the wire bundle and the fuel cross-feed valve operating valve throughout its range of travel, in accordance with the applicable service bulletin.
 - b. If any chafing is detected, repair the chafed wire, ensure that the wire bundle is routed correctly and ensure that a minimum clearance of 6mm (0.25-inch) exists between the wire bundle and the fuel cross-feed valve operating valve throughout its range of travel, in accordance with the applicable service bulletin.

CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY

SCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

Note 2: FAA AD 2000-22-22 Amdt 39-11970 refers.

Compliance: For Requirement 1 - Within 50 flight hours or 6 months after the effective date of this Directive, whichever occurs first.

For Requirement 2 - Before further flight.

This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 25 January 2001.

Background: This Directive requires inspection of the wire bundle to relay 'KT' on panel 'JA' for correct routing, adequate clearance from the fuel cross-feed valve operating lever, and the presence of chafing. The Directive also requires necessary action to correct any wiring anomaly.

These actions are intended to detect and correct chafing of the wire bundle exiting panel 'JA' due to insufficient clearance from the fuel cross-feed valve operating lever. Chafing of the wire bundle could result in a fire in the area of the fuel system in a confined space.



Eugene Paul Holzapfel
Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority

11 December 2000