
AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE

For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.1 (1) of CASR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.

De Havilland DH 83 (Fox Moth) Series Aeroplanes**AD/DH 83/2 Cockpit Safety Harness Installation - Integrity 12/2003
and Lifing**

Applicability: All DH 83 series aircraft.

Requirement:

1. Inspect integrity of the front and rear cockpit safety harness installations in accordance with Accomplishment Instruction Paragraph 2A of British Aerospace Mandatory TNS CT(Moth) No. 33 Issue 2, dated 21 March 2002.
2. Replace front and rear cockpit safety harnesses in accordance with Accomplishment Instruction Paragraph 2D of British Aerospace Mandatory TNS CT(Moth) No. 33 Issue 2 dated 21 March 2002.

Note: UK CAA AD 007-03-99 refers.

Compliance:

1. Within 10 flying hours after 27 November 2003 or before 31 December 2003, whichever occurs first; unless the initial inspection was previously accomplished in accordance with Issue 1 or Issue 2 of the Requirement document. Inspect thereafter at intervals not to exceed 12 months.
2. Within 9 years of the initial installation date of harness or, if the installation date is not known, within 150 flying hours after 27 November 2003 or before 27 May 2004, whichever occurs first. Replace thereafter at intervals not to exceed 9 years.

This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 27 November 2003.

De Havilland DH 83 (Fox Moth) Series Aeroplanes

AD/DH 83/2 (continued)

Background: Investigation into a fatal accident in UK revealed that the harness restraint cables and one lap strap near the stitching, had failed during impact. Subsequent investigation revealed that the strength of the webbing had significantly deteriorated without any visual indication.



David Villiers
Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority

14 October 2003